17年里,有着太多的放弃.但是严格来说,从未有放弃过处在逆境的你.

只希望你一切都好,或许,是时候说再见了.

再见,以一个充满希望的句号结束我们的故事.

再见,以一个委婉的回首结束我们对于过往的眷恋.

或者,我继续朝着我的梦想奔跑,而你,则沉浸在自己的世界.

不管怎样,再见了.

6月中，纽约的天，还是那么冷。妈说我这是血液缺乏循环，那我不早晕了。

妈来了，无比幸福。爸的电话来了，无比感慨。有什么能比这更美好的事情？

家里的书还是成堆，心也被填的满满的。

如果名牌大学是人生的保障，我的人生危险无比；

如果拥有思想和内涵的能力是成功的钥匙，我钥匙串上的那些金属片应该和当年看琴房的老师的一样多

如果热情是快乐的源泉，我的那片土地贫瘠干旱

如果冷静是夏日里的冰块，我的家已被搬到了北极圈

还有什么？

多喝热水，多盖被子

我的第17个暑假，无比美好

我的生活，终于上了轨道了

地球的那一边，你，要加油

我知道，让你好好照顾自己的话已经被说了成千上万边了；如此的话，我希望你可以加油，安慰的话永远听不够，鼓励的话永远都不算晚

大家都加油吧；抬起头，望向云端。在那里，不只有灵魂的歌唱，还有不灭的希望

绝对不会服输；绝对不会投降；绝对不会放弃

就算遍体鳞伤，I live; I live, to FEEL

窗外警车呼啸而过，盯着那被自己遗忘了快7个小时的瓦斯炉，两个字，惊悚。不知道何时自己已经走到了这个只有前进没有退却的地方，手中抓住的是那个似有似无的救命稻草。怕过，累过，倦过，但是当每天睁开双眼，看到那洗刷一切疲倦的阳光；心中如天，万里无云。还要多久，答案才会来临；又或许在自己每次努力的时候，答案已经揭晓。还要多久，其实也没有多久。看着照片中爸妈的笑脸，凝视镜头里父母眼角时间的痕迹，其实也没有多久。或许没有多久，我就可以成为他们引以为傲的孩子，或许没有多久，一切都可以回到从前。

捶打着已因酸痛而麻木的背，还有4个Act要注解，不服为什么莎翁写成这样还叫做伟人。。伟大的能折磨死人啊。。

 

今天的新年过的很奇怪，没有那种要把过去抹去并重新开始的感觉。或许，没有结束，何来的开始。外婆在电话那头说属于我的长征才走了十分之一，靓子要吃得饱饱的。

 

我会，我一定会。

外面是雪白的一片；手上是触目惊心的红；埋没在学海之中的；是对于未来归穴的憧憬；而然，是属于人性的谑

一边一边的重复，只是为了顽固自己的信念；新的故事，充斥了易枯竭的灵魂

我需要热忱，却不此为何意；宛如甜点的热情，只是生活的装饰

我需要逻辑，却徘徊在此中；犹如板块般的理性，原来富有着延伸的可能

我需要责任感，却被此所困；仿佛成铁的重量，定义了彼此的生命的意义

 

我永远告诉自己我爱你们，那是对于责任的缅怀

我永远告诉自己我可以，那是对于命运的挑战

 

不久后，我将会在众人面前用自己的方式来爱你们，无论是音乐还是文字

只因为，这是你们的我，而你们的我，是如此的与众不同

雾都已经散去，眼前的道路是如此的清晰与明了。

 

其实一切都很简单，照着计划一步步走就可以了， 要脚踏实地的咯。

 

It’s hard for a writer to write the beginning of a story, so they write the ends backward to the beginning. It’s hard for a composer to compose the ends of the music, so they put the beginnings as their ends. It’s hard to endure the disappearance of the people whom they loved, so Egyptians started to pray for people’s death as the beginning of a new life in another world. It’s hard for people to get ride of the idea of suffering, so Buddhism taught us to praise the chances to suffer. It’s hard for me to avoid the mistakes I made, so I pushed myself to face them. If you can’t get out it, then get into it. And if we put lower expectation on the outcome of our dreams, we will pray for the higher and better results the realizations brought out.

 

其真一直很好，真的很好，会沿着自己选择的路一直走下去，因为那是我的--责任。

I laught at the tales about all the romatic loves; kept thinking that those are ridiculous. Satring at people around me, there is a great, well, I could have said that, a GREAT percentage that I won't fall in love with someone....at least for 10 years, or even longer..

 

I can't understand the expression between couples, well, however, Mom keeps telling all the theories she knows. I just can't...

and I won't..

i barely know why it appeared to be 3172 lines long, however, because it is imagined within a consciousness which has learned to expect that the soul will find and ultimate home, certainly, I'm in. Sitting inn front of the laptop, kicking myself on the row, nervous yet anticipated, there was a moment that I was eagerly to figure out the way of the man, Beowulf, who played his whole life in the ancient poem BEOWULF actually lived along with..There was a moment...

重新再来一次，丢掉以前的杂念。还有一个月，重新再来一次。思绪会更清晰。。。

 

丢掉自己以前的迷恋。。重来一次。。。。

 

只有一个月了。。

老人家说。。。。12年。。1，000年。。一万年。。。是轮回。。。。可是。。我为什么。。

17年前的九月二日是星期二。。。（不知道吧。。。）应该是了。。。凌晨二点十分零二秒我被医生从老妈的肚子里拉出来。。。

17年后的九月二日是星期二。。。（绝对是。。。）。。。凌晨二点十分。。我和老妈一起整理房间。。。。

轮回阿。。绕过了大半个地球。。。。。

我。。。17了。。。。老了老了。。。。

终于。。。搬完了。。。。。。。

新家阿。。。。。。。

我知道，自己选择了这条路；

我知道，我不该抱怨；

我知道，我该勇敢地面对所有的困难；

我知道，我该坦然地接受所有的结果；

我知道，时间与努力的积累和结合，将会弥补知识上的空缺；

我知道，我会和别人拥有截然不同的人生；

所以我知道-----努力吧，

                    只有靠自己了

THESE days in Peshawar, where al-Qaeda was founded 20 years ago, the only glimpse of Osama bin Laden comes on little green packets of safety matches strewn around town by American officials. They bear the portrait of the world’s most wanted man, along with the promise that America will pay up to $5 million for information leading to his capture.

It is an appropriate image. Like one of these matches, Mr bin Laden caused a flash with the September 11th attacks on America in 2001, then vanished into smoke, leaving a burning trail of militancy stretching from Indonesia to Afghanistan, Iraq, north Africa and Europe. And despite the reward offered for his capture, now $25m, nobody has yet betrayed the whereabouts of “the Sheikh”, who periodically emerges on the internet to deliver some doom-laden warning to the West.

 

Nearly seven years into America’s “global war on terror”, the result remains inconclusive. Al-Qaeda lost a safe haven in Afghanistan, but is rebuilding another one in Pakistan; Mr bin Laden is at large, but Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who masterminded September 11th, has gone on trial in Guantánamo Bay; many leaders have been captured or killed, but others have taken their place; al-Qaeda faces an ideological backlash, but young Muslims still volunteer to blow themselves up.

True, America has not been struck since 2001, but European capitals have been bombed. A number of plots have been averted on both sides of the Atlantic. Al-Qaeda and its nebula of like-minded groups still pose the most direct threat to the security of Western countries, and of many others besides. Western intelligence agencies are convinced al-Qaeda still wants to develop non-conventional weapons, whether chemical or biological agents or “dirty bombs” that create a cloud of radioactivity. In Iraq bombs are already mixed with chlorine gas. Even a rudimentary nuclear bomb, say the spooks, might not be beyond the reach of terrorists.

Al-Qaeda has built on decades of Middle Eastern terrorism. Palestinian groups internationalised their violence in the 1970s; Hizbullah used suicide-bombers against the Americans in Lebanon back in 1983; Palestinian suicide-bombers sought to inflict maximum civilian casualties in Israel from 1994; and Algerians who hijacked a French airliner the same year tried to fly it into the Eiffel Tower but were foiled.

 

In those days, though, attacking Western targets was part of a local nationalist or sectarian fight. Al-Qaeda’s dark genius was to weave these strands together with the tools of globalisation to create a networked movement with a single worldwide cause: jihad against America. Conventional terrorist groups, such as the Basque ETA movement or even Lebanon’s Hizbullah, often keep their violence in bounds to avoid alienating their political supporters. But global jihadists, without a domestic constituency, seek to maximise civilian casualties for spectacular effect. Counting the victims is tricky. Attacks on Western civilians have dropped, but the routine use of suicide-bombings has raised the slaughter, mostly of Muslims, to appalling levels .

Al-Qaeda’s ideology was forged by one big victory and two decades of failures. Disparate Arab fighters who helped Afghan ones evict Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 were initially elated, but became dejected by the ensuing civil war and the failure of violent campaigns in Egypt, Algeria and elsewhere. Many extremists decided to end the bloodletting. But a cadre of wandering jihadists gathered in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban and decided to redirect their ire from the “near” enemy to the “far” one.

The rationale was explained by Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s co-founder, in his memoirs, entitled “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner”. The “Jewish-Crusader alliance”, as he called the West, would never allow its local allies to be toppled. The answer was to attack America directly.

Such tactics would have several advantages, Mr Zawahiri said. They would deal “a blow to the great master”. Given the depth of anti-Americanism across the Muslim world, they would “win over the nation”. And the attacks would sow discord between Western countries and their local allies, presenting America with a dilemma: withdraw support from its friends or become directly involved in the Middle East. If America took military action, Mr Zawahiri argued, “the battle will turn into clear-cut jihad against the infidels,” which Muslims were bound to support.

Seen in this light, one of the objectives of the September 11th attacks was to provoke the Americans into invading Muslim lands. But if al-Qaeda intended to trap America in Afghanistan, its plan went badly awry, at least initially. The Taliban fell quickly in 2001 and al-Qaeda’s followers were forced into hiding.

A hubristic America, however, then walked into a trap of its own making by invading Iraq in 2003. It got rid of a dangerous dictator but gave the jihadists a popular cause against American occupiers in the Muslim heartland. For a while the jihadists thought they could carve out a base in Iraq from which to destabilise the region. That danger may now have been averted. Helped by al-Qaeda’s excesses, a bloodied America seems to be fighting its way out of the worst of the troubles it created for itself.

 

The beginning of the end?

So terrorism experts are now debating whether al-Qaeda is starting to burn itself out. “On balance, we are doing pretty well,” Michael Hayden, the director of America’s Central Intelligence Agency, told the Washington Post in May. “Near strategic defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Near strategic defeat for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Significant setbacks for al-Qaeda globally—and here I’m going to use the word ‘ideologically’—as a lot of the Islamic world pushes back on their form of Islam.”

Many thought he was being overly optimistic. Had General Hayden himself not given warning two months earlier that the restoration of an al-Qaeda haven in Pakistan’s tribal belt constituted a “clear and present danger” to the West?

A related argument has been provoked by “Leaderless Jihad”, a book by Marc Sageman, a counter-terrorism consultant. He argues that al-Qaeda’s core leadership has been “neutralised operationally”. The bigger danger now comes from loose groups of Muslims in the West who radicalise each other and carry out autonomous, self-financed attacks.

This thesis has come in for strong criticism, particularly from Professor Bruce Hoffman of Georgetown University. He notes that al-Qaeda’s imminent death has often been heralded in the past, only to be contradicted by the sound of new explosions. Many plots in Europe have direct connections back to Pakistan, he notes.

Part of the problem lies in al-Qaeda’s diffuse nature. Its core members may number only hundreds, but it has connections of all kinds to militant groups with thousands or even tens of thousands of fighters. Al-Qaeda is a terrorist organisation, a militant network and a subculture of rebellion all at the same time.

To explain the movement, many experts draw parallels with globalisation. Some describe it as a venture-capital firm that invests in promising terrorist projects. Others speak of it as a global “brand” maintained by its leaders through their propaganda, with its growing number of “franchises” carrying out attacks.

The rise of al-Qaeda’s stateless terrorism does not mean that the old state-sponsored variety has disappeared. Libya, which once supported the IRA and other violent causes, may now be co-operating with the West, but Iran, among others, supports both Palestinian militants and Lebanon’s Hizbullah movement. Should Iran redirect Hizbullah towards a global terrorist campaign against the West—for instance, if the country’s nuclear sites were bombed—the effect might be more devastating than any of al-Qaeda’s works.

For the moment, though, the most immediate global threat comes from the ungoverned, undergoverned and ungovernable areas of the Muslim world. These include the Afghan-Pakistani border, the parts of Iraq still in turmoil, the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and swathes of Yemen, Somalia, the western Sahara desert and the chain of islands between Indonesia and the Philippines.

Just as important as any of these is the “virtual caliphate” of cyberspace. The internet binds together the amorphous cloud of jihadist groups, spreads the ideology, weaves together the “single narrative” that Islam is under attack, popularises militant acts and distributes terrorist know-how. Because al-Qaeda is so dispersed, the fight against it has strained an international order still based on sovereign states.

This special report will attempt to answer the impossible question posed in 2003 in a leaked memo from Donald Rumsfeld, then America’s defence secretary: “Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?”

 

                                                                     ----The Economist

 

 

 

 

在外婆家里窝了两个星期，实在是觉得如天堂般的梦幻与不可思议。别的不说，光看这丰盛的早中晚饭加两顿点心，还有那突飞猛进的体重和日益圆润的体形，便可想而知了。。。。比起自己一个人在美国除了紫菜汤就是番茄汤的日子，此不说吾幸福，更待何时？